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INTRODUCTION This work examines the question: what is the relationship of the Joint Task Force
Commander and the United States Ambassador during contingency operations conducted by the United States. This is accomplished through examination of the impacts of this relationship on operations conducted for regime change and how it influenced conflict termination in the 20th century. To answer this question the work examines two historic case studies: (1) Operation Just Cause, the intervention into Panama to remove the regime of Manuel Noriega and (2) Operation Uphold Democracy; an intervention in Haiti in 1994 to restore the government of Jean Baptist Aristide. Moreover, the work examines communication and integration between the strategic policy makers, the Department of State and the Department of Defense and how they are linked to the Joint Task Force to answer the primary research question.
The larger questions that are exposed in this research include: how does the JTF commander conduct planning toward the desired end state and not just those purely militarilyachievable objectives derived from that end state? What responsibility does the JTF commander have for planning the transition from military operations to those better served by the Department of State and other instruments of national power? What is the operational link to the strategic process that will help build a comprehensive end-to-end plan of action required by the United States Government in pursuit of its national security objectives?
The United States has primarily engaged in limited conflicts since the end of World War II. The cases selected reflect instances in which the United States Government conducted intervention, not total war, for the goal of regime change. The selected cases each highlight one of the forms of conflict termination defined later in this work. These cases are of interest as they highlight the difficulties that can arise in situations where there is not a strong relationship between the Joint Task Force Commander and the in country Ambassador. As stated by the research question the work will primarily focus on the Joint Task Force and the relationship it has 1 with the in country ambassador, if it is different from the relationship of the next senior level of command, and if so why.
Selecting Cases: From World War II to the Modern Day The U.S. occupation of Germany and Japan following the end of World War II terminated the last declared war in U.S. history. Since World War II, the U.S. has been involved in dozens of military operations that were not total war; however, the relationship this work seeks to understand is more interesting than the examples provided by World War II. This makes the use of World War II case studies less relevant for this body of research.
The Korean and Vietnam Conflicts also do not provide the insights sought by this project.
Korea was a United Nations (UN) action to restore South Korea's borders. Additionally, while U.S. forces did cross that border it was never a stated goal to remove the North Korean regime.
As the Korean conflict was never officially terminated it is not suitable for this study. The
Vietnam conflict, while undoubtedly capable of providing useful insights into interagency operations, does not serve the purpose of this research because although the United States government did allow regime change to occur during the conflict, it was not the stated goal of intervention. In fact it was the opposite of the stated goal. The U.S. was trying to prevent regime collapse.
The next interventions considered for study were Grenada and Panama. These cases represent Cold War-era conflicts in which the U.S. conducted operations for the explicit purpose of regime change. Grenada as a contingency operation focused on dislodging Communist footholds in a United States sphere of influence. Conversely, the invasion of Panama specifically targeted the regime of Manuel Noriega and restoration of the legally elected government thus making it a prime case to use as the base for this study. 13 Ibid., [192] [193] [194] [195] 14 Gabriel Marcella and General Frederick F. Woerner Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), "The Road to War: The U. S -Panamanian Crisis, 1987 -1989 While there were unconfirmed leaks, official findings concluded that Panamanian Defense forces and Noriega either ignored the warnings due to ineptitude or that a full attack was not expected.
Regardless the Panamanian Defense Forces were not prepared for the magnitude of the United
States force that attacked. Haiti LTG Shelton received orders to halt 2370 and prepare to execute 2380 the following day. 48 Ibid., 57-60. 49 Ibid., 70-71, 78. Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow. 63 Clausewitz defined war as "the act of force to compel our enemy to do our will" 64 He argued that the political ends determine both the military objective and the resources required. He stressed the point to achieve the objectives of a war the country's political and military leaders must focus on three factors: the system of opposition or the total capabilities of its military forces, economic means and popular support available and how long war is sustainable. 65 Clausewitz believed a nation needed to compel the enemy through coercion or persuasion into compliance.
Eliminating an enemy's economic means of fighting allows nations to achieve success. While With the decision to execute, President Bush provided one clearly political objective among the four listed, reestablish democracy In Panama. The fact that democracy never was defined as an end-state objective and was understood implicitly and intuitively made it easy for diplomatic and military leaders to articulate the position that To neutralize the Haitian Armed Forces (Fad'H) and police; to protect U.S. citizens, third country nationals, designated Haitians' interests and property; to conduct a 78 Fischel, vii. 79 Antizzo, 50. 30 NEO (non-combatant evacuation operation) as required; to restore civil order; to establish essential services…and to set the conditions for the re-establishment of the legitimate government of Haiti.
80
The military also assisted with the reorganization of the Haitian Armed Forces and police, but were not the proponent for this portion of the operation. 81 The 84 Ibid., [244] [245] [246] [247] [248] [249] [250] Bonham, interview.
In the case of Just Cause unity of effort was achieved in the Department of Defense, the same cannot be said of the other government agency plans for Just Cause. Rather, unity of effort within the interagency arena was ragged at best. Foremost among the reasons was that throughout the planning process, none of the agencies that would have to participate in the restoration of Panama were involved in the development of Blind Logic. It was classified, compartmentalized, and held almost exclusively within DoD channels. 
